Abstract-Memory-intensive applications have grown rapidly in order to adapt to the changing needs of businesses. Memory errors become even more concerning, since configuration at extended operating points makes hardware more susceptible to system failures. Some data structures may be more sensitive to errors and may cause system crashes more easily than others. A failure in a critical data structure can cause a complete system crash. In this paper, we propose a sensitivity characterization to the hypervisor structures. First, we implement an errorinjection framework using Syscall ptrace. We profile both static and dynamic data structures through our framework. Then we provide the detailed analysis and data characterization to QEMU hypervisor. Finally, we discuss the checkpointing and selective mechanism in case the QEMU hypervisor crash.
I. INTRODUCTION
In-memory computing technology has grown rapidly, to adapt to changing needs of businesses. A growing number of in-memory applications have gained popularity in recent years [1] . These applications and their quality of services will generate a large number of mission-critical workloads that frequently access memory or cache [2] , [3] , [4] . As a result, requirements on the correctness and stability of memory are stricter in these types of applications. Consequently, demand for high-availability memory access has increased considerably.
On the other hand, typical memory components gradually become error-prone under increasing density and capacity [5] , and thus fail to guarantee high availability (HA) for these applications. Moreover, uncorrected errors from DRAM, i.e. those detected by hardware and cannot be corrected, are a significant cause of system downtime [6] . For example, introducing more reliability into a system, at any level, invariably reduces performance. This means that a practical design has to strike a balance between these two attributes in the design. When we inject errors to sensitive structures, QEMU [7] and KVM [8] are significantly more prone to crashes.
In this paper, we propose the error-injection approach which could emulate the crash of QEMU hypervisor, and provide data characterization of different sensitive structures inside QEMU hypervisor. Our experiments considered the reliability of memories, determined which software components can safely remain in the relaxed side of the system and how dynamic adaptation of the system configuration can help us limit performance degradation to a minimum. This kind of information is very important to the design decisions and the overall approach of the high avaliability system. For example, it can be used as an input to the predictor module and the checkpoint mechanism. In details, this paper has the following architecture:
• We use Syscall ptrace [9] to find an address of a sensitive data structure in the process memory, bit-flip a random bit to that address, and finally observe the impact to the running state of QEMU hypervisor.
• We read the symbol table from .elf file using objdump.
We run a benchmark VM (e.g., Specjbb benchmark [10] ), use pmap pid or /proc/pid/maps to find the virtual address of the static area.
• We use both manual and automatic dumps to find the address of the dynamic data structure from the heap area. The manual dump is implemented with the pointer while the automatic dump is implemented with Syscalls malloc hook and backtrace.
• We provide good data characterization in our experiment result. Using our error injection approach, we can rank the most sensitive structures during the running period of the QEMU hypervisor and the benchmark VM.
• Using Libvirt commands, we implement a various checkpoint and judge mechanism so that we can determine when we setup and insert a checkpoint and which size should a checkpoint duplicate.
• We discuss the approach of selective checkpointing mechanism for memory backup. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The overall framework of error injection is introduced in Section III. This section also provides details regarding its implementation, and Section IV provide data characterization about QEMU hypervisor. Section V discusses full and selective checkpointing mechanisms using Libvirt. Section VI covers related work, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
This section demonstrates the background of the used techniques in this paper.
A. DRAM Architecture for System Level Data 1) DRAM architecture: Dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) [11] is a type of random access semiconductor memory that stores each bit of data in a separate tiny capacitor within an integrated circuit. DRAM is usually arranged in a rectangular array of charge storage cells consisting of one capacitor and transistor per data bit. In morden DRAM chips, it has various memory control units (MCUs) [11] which manage the allocation from the system or software layers. An MCU lies in the DRAM bank which could be regarded as the basic control unit.
2) Address Management: Modern operating system use physical address and virtual address to store the data inside the memory. A physical address is the actual location in the hardware memory. A virtual address is determined by OS kernel and process. They have the mapping relationship with segment and page table. A page table is the data structure used by a virtual memory system in a computer operating system to store the mapping between virtual addresses and physical addresses. A translation lookaside buffer (TLB) [11] is a memory cache that is used to reduce the time taken to access a user memory location. It is a part of the chips memory-management unit (MMU) [11] . The TLB stores the recent translations of virtual memory to physical memory and can be called an address-translation cache
B. Virtual Address Space
A virtual address space is the set of virtual addresses that an operating system makes available to a process. In Linux system, the layout is handled by mm struct [12] . To any running process, the operating system allocates the memory space so that it can maintain the normal events for the application. Shown in Figure 1 , the process memory area could be divided to library space, static global space and heap area. The library space stores the dynamic libraries such as libso, libnss, libpthread [12] . The storage of dynamic library do not rely on the running state of any process. On the other hand, a process will build a redirected mapping to that process area. So different processes have different virtual addresses of dynamic library, but the physical address of dynamic library to the different processes are the same. The static global data stores the data defined in the application including initialized and uninitialized symbols, functions, data structures. All the offsets of static data have already confirmed during the compile time. And if a process for that application is running, the virtual address of any static data is confirmed by the global base address + offset. During the whole running period of that process, the virtual address of any static data structure is not changed. The dynamic data is stored in the heap area. The heap is memory set aside for dynamic allocation. There is no enforced pattern to the allocation and deallocation of blocks from the heap. Operating system can allocate a block at any time and free it at any time. This makes it much more complex to keep track of which parts of the heap are allocated or free at any given time; there are many custom heap allocators available to tune heap performance for different usage patterns. To any dynamic data, they are defined by the application as non-static and non-global in application source code. And during the running time, they will be executed by malloc/kalloc.
III. ERROR INJECTION ARCHITECTURE
QEMU is a userspace hypervisor which can create the execution of KVM for various usecase. QEMU can also emulate different instruction sets and machine architectures and support more than 300 kinds of kernels. So QEMU data stuctures could be chosen as the typical observed target and we can first read the data structures from QEMU hypervisor and error inject the sensitive data structures inside QEMU running process. In this section, we will demonstrate our error injection framework and the profiling approach to QEMU sensitive data structures.
A. Error Injection Framework
In our error injection scenario, our plan is to find an address of a sensitive data structure in the process memory, bit-flip a random bit to that address, and finally observe the impact to the running state of QEMU hypervisor. In term of error injection to the physical address, we can manually configure the underlying cell or bank inside DRAM. For example, you can revise the cell voltage so that some bits could be disabled. However, this approach requires the high frequent interaction between memory controller and software layer. Even we can find the approach to couple these elements, we cannot address the interleaving functionality of memory controller. Therefore, we can also use software/system approach to the physical address. We can dump the footprint using Syscall ptrace to operate the virtual address in the userspace memory. Syscall ptrace provides the functionality that a process can profile and even update the execution of another process. That includes the examination and revision of memory and registers from the target process. Compare with the footprint of /dev/mem, ptrace approach require no kernel modification and recompiling but it performs the same functionality with /dev/mem/. In this paper, we adopt ptrace to build up our error injection framework. Figure 2 shows the overall error injection framework using the Syscall ptrace. We will introduce the modules through Fig. 2 . The error injection framework to static data structure using ptrace bottom-up sequence. The substrate module is implemented by ptrace. We configure the parameter with PEEK DATA and POKE DATA. PEEK DATA can enable ptrace dump the data of the target virtual address while POKE DATA can write the new value to the target address. The workflow of this module is as follows:
B. Ptrace Module
• Step 1: When we confirm a virtual address of a data structure, we configure PEEK DATA to get the data of that virtual address. • Step 2: We choose a random bit and flip it using XOR 1.
• Step 3: We write the new data to the virtual address and then profile the execution of the hypervisor. With ptrace, we can simply revise data of any virtual address in a process memory space. In the next step, we will think about how to find the virtual address of any data structure. We can classify the data structures of hypervisor by the static and dynamic. We will use the following two subsections to provide the details.
C. Profiling Static Data Structure
In a process memory space, the addresses from all static data structures are generated during the compiling period. After the generation of an executive file (e.g., elf file), we can use Linux command objdump or readelf to browse the symbol table of all static data structures. In this symbol table, we can lookup the offset of any data structure. The offset is never changed so long as the source code is not recompiled. Actual, an offset in the symbol table is not the real virtual address because operating system does not always allocate memory through the 0 base address. To this point, the virtual address of a given static data structure is the basic address plus offset. Therefore, we should find the base address of the running hypervisor. This reply on the read of hypervisor process area. On the other hand, the virtual address of any static data structure is not changed during the execution period because both base address and offset are fixed in a process.
Shown in Figure 2 , we can simply read any process area through its pid with pmap command or /proc/pid/maps. Hence the address and corresponding data could also be read through QEMU process area. We show the workflow of error-injection to the static data structure as follows:
• Step 1: Compile the QEMU hypervisor. After generating the .elf file, use objdump (or readelf ) to get the symbol table of all static data structure. • Step 2: Find the offset of a given data structure through symbol table.
• Step 3: Run a benchmark VM (e.g., Specjbb benchmark), use pmap pid or /proc/pid/maps to find the base address of the static area.
• Step 4: The virtual address of a given static data structure is its base address + offset. • Step 5: Use ptrace PEEK DATA flag to read the address and POKE DATA to revise the data. Then profile the variation of the hypervisor execution.
D. Profiling Dynamic Data Structure
The dynamic data structure is defined inside a function without static and global property. Its address is confirmed during the running time. It is usually generated through the calling of malloc/kalloc etc. And during the running period, the address lies in the heap area of a process space. Finding the virtual address of dynamic data structure are more complicated than that of static structure. There are two challenges to capture the virtual address of a given dynamic data structure:
• Challenge 1: A virtual address of the dynamic data structure only alive with the calling or the execution situation of the function. We can only capture its instant virtual address of the dynamic structure. Even we hope to error inject it, we will bit-flip the data immediately after finding the virtual address.
• Challenge 2: A dynamic data structure associates with various functions (unlike static structure). That increases the difficulty of data characterization when we observe the error injection to the dynamic data structure. Motivated by the two challenges, In this paper, we use two approaches to read and error-inject data from a heap address: manual dump and automatic dump. Fig. 3 . The dynamic error-injection using manual dump 1) Manual Dump: In the manual dump approach, we patch every sensitive data structure with a pointer before the compile and then all the values of pointers are the virtual address. In the next step, we can error-inject this address use ptrace. The steps could be shown in Figure 3 .
• Step 1: Range the dynamic data structures with frequency. Linux GDB [13] or Vagrind [14] can provide such functionality. • Step 2: To a given dynamic data structure, we can use tools to find all the callers and their initialized function. • Step 3: We patch all the callers with pointer so that when QEMU hypervisor runs, it can print the pointer value (the virtual address). This could also been recorded in QEMU log file. • Step 4: Use ptrace POKE DATA to revise the data immediately when we get the address. Then profile the variation of the hypervisor execution. This approach is the most direct way to find heap area address. However, it has large drawback. First, it requires large source code modification. Second, we can only find dynamic data structure through our read. The code read work is huge.
The reading also includes 1) finding the complex relationship between interleaving data structures; 2) finding all the variation from a data structure.
2) Automatic Dump:
In the automatic dump approach, we can create a dynamic link library to intercept all the malloc operation. For example, we can use malloc hook to do that. Figure 4 shows the dynamic error-injection using automatic dump to the sensitive data structure. The malloc call tool can record all the malloc /realloc addresses in the heap. The tool can also record which function call the malloc in the heap. Hence, we provide the workflow as follows:
• Step 1: Revise the QEMU (or other userspace hypervisor) makefile using rdynamic configuration. rdynamic can enable the linker to show all symbols so that we can get the address information. • Step 2: Create a dynamic library using malloc hook. The malloc call tool can trap all the malloc/realloc addresses in the heap. • Step 3: Print the caller use backtrace Syscall, so that when malloc hook traps a malloc from a dynamic data structure, we can find its caller. • Step 4: Run the QEMU hypervisor using LD PRELOAD = XX.so so that we can enable the QEMU process dynamically load our malloc hook library. When QEMU runs, the standard output will show all the virtual address of malloc function and its caller in a process. • Step 5: Use ptrace POKE DATA to revise the data immediately when we get the address. Then profile the variation of the hypervisor execution. In this section, we propose the evaluation of our data characterization framework.
A. Used Benchmark and Testing Tools
We mainly targeted the ARM XGene2 architecture [15] but we used also the Intel architecture. The Libvirt is used as the monitor APIs. We executed three typical Cloud benchmarks on the VMs: Parsec [16] , Memcached [17] , Specjbb [10] . We inject all errors when running the benchmarks and we trace only QEMU crashes. In our experiments, we discovered that some kinds of errors trigger QEMU crash and thus we record all such errors. We choose 80 typical modules which affect 3,000 QEMU functions. In this report, we list most sensitive modules and functions. For each trace, we run our simulation 50 times (1 minute per time) Figure 5 shows the failures of modules in case the Parsec, Memcached, and Specjbb benchmarks are used as a workload on top of QEMU. In this experiment, we found that the memory section has many sensitive modules. For example, the page module incurs 60 system failures, while the memory module incurs 16 failures. In Memcached experiment, we use CloudSuite to emulate Memcached client and server. Memory modules such as mem, page, they incur higher failures than that in Parsec benchmark. For experiments with Specjbb benchmark, we create 2 JVMs inside the guest virtual machine and setup the warehouse threshold as 1 minute. We found that rcu failures are higher than the previous two benchmarks. That means Specjbb JVM needs more read-copy update for communication.
B. Static Data Characterization

C. Dynamic Data Characterization
In this subsection, we use manual dump approach to measure the dynamic data characterization. We create three VMs which run Parsec, Specjbb, and Memcached benchmark separately. We choose 100 typical dynamic structures which cover 22 modules of QEMU hypervisor. The time threshold is set up with 1 minute. We run and error-inject these benchmarks 100 times, and then count the number of crash. We can get the following results. Figure 6 shows the failures of modules in case the Parsec, Memcached and Specjbb benchmarks to these modules who contain the dynamic structures. Similar to the case of static data structure, tb, tcg and page module have various crashes when we error injection the corresponding data structures. That is because QEMU setup more exception handler to handle the error of those structures. On the other hand, ferret similar search does not take too much RCU computation. And tlb module shows the error because it manages the PTE lookup for virtual address translation. The wrong result will cause the exception in memory module of QEMU. On the other hand, Memcached benchmark requires various memory translation through guest virtual address to the host virtual address from QEMU. The memory management module in QEMU maintains the relationship between guest physical memory (GPM) and guest virtual memory (GVM) for each VM and intercepts all PTE operations. So we find that the structures in terms of page, tcg, mem becomes higher than those in Parsec situation. In Specjbb benchmark, because the 2 JVMs inside the guest VM periodically communicate with each other. It requires more RCU computation than Parsec and Memcached. On the other hand,
D. Frequency of Calling Modules
Actually, we need to measure the frequency of used data structures of QEMU hypervisor. The reason is because if a data structure is never accessed through the running period but it cannot be regarded as a non-sensitive as if we errorinject this structure, it still has the possible to crash the whole hypervisor. Thus, we choose the typical data structures from the above modules and and profile them in 1 minutes. Figure 7 shows the results. We found that AioContext appears most times and the next is kvm pic. AioContext issues the QEMU multi-thread mechanism while kvm pic provides the segment for QEMU interrupt. That means during a running time of any given benchmark (Parsec, Memcached and Specjbb in this paper), the hypervisor has plenty of events for multi-thread and interrupt. On the other hand, we found that many memory allocation events also show high frequency such as structures PhysPageEntry and kvm userspace memory region. The CPU events show lower frequent than the memory events.
V. BACKUP AND CHECKPOINTING SOLUTION
Checkpoint mechanism keeps the state of disk, CPU, memory of a VM and even hypervisor (QEMU) itself in a short time. We expect to use checkpoint to keep the sensitive structures of a hypervisor and VM so that whenever the native hypervisor or VM occurs crash. The backup file can quickly be migrated to replace the native one so that the working state of the hypervisor has slightly been affected by the underlying DRAM and CPU errors. The other approach is copy-on-write mechanism, where the native memory, image, CPU register has a write operation, the backup memory, image, CPU register will do the same operation as well. We prefer the checkpoint solution.
We found that the Libvirt has already embedded the checkpointing APIs and we can simply use these to implement full checkpoint and backup. In this section, we will discuss the checkpoint and backup implementation.
A. Full Checkpoint Duplication
Using Libvirt commands, we implement a various checkpoint and judge mechanism so that we can determine when we setup and insert a checkpoint and which size should a checkpoint duplicate. Figure 8 gives the whole checkpoint architecture in this paper. We use QEMU as the userspace hypervisor to manage the events from VM. A VM instance will link to its image and then we can backup its image using qemu-monitor-command. On the other hand, the hypervisor itself is regarded as the application files which could also be backuped with Libvirt. In this figure, through the QEMU hypervisor command qemumonitor-command, we can acquire both VM image information and hypervisor file information. 
B. Performance Evaluation about Checkpoint
In this subsection, we present the performance evaluation about checkpointing and backup mechanism.
In Figure 9 , we use Parsec ferret similar search to record the times of read and write between non-checkpinting and checkpointing. We setup every 15 seconds our checkpointing mechanism raise a checkpoint. The caption with the backup suffix means we add the checkpoint and backup in our experiment. The caption with the normal suffix means we measure the read and write Syscall normally. Actually, duplication will generate the double write overhead. However, we found that read and write are slightly affected by the overhead. We propose the reason that Linux will create another process for our checkpoint architecture. The checkpointing itself does not need too much read and write (syscall).
VI. RELATED WORK
This section describes the related work about error injection and checkpoint.
A. Error Injection
Generally, existing error injection solutions for data characterization can be divided into two categories: hardware and software. Hardware solutions enhance availability with special motherboards and/or memory chips. Software solutions are mostly based on the emulation and system level error injection. In hardware error injection, the system SASSIFI [18] provides efficiency by allowing instrumentation code to execute entirely on the GPU. Rizwan A. Ashraf [19] et al. proposex a fault propagation framework to analyze how faults propagate in MPI applications and to understand their vulnerability to faults. Software level error injection is more general in this area because it relies on system-level support which can be deployed easier. In this field, a tool called MEI [20] was implemented in physical address space for memory errors injection and manipulation. Guanpeng Li et al. [21] observed the GPUCPU interaction boundary naturally limits error propagation in GPU applications compared to traditional non-GPU applications.
B. Checkpoint Solution for Hypervisor
Initially, hardware providers typically considered using extra bits to check and correct memory errors. Parity [22] checking is a common technology, which uses one extra bit to check data. Another solution is ECC [23] , which uses Hamming Codes [24] to detect and correct internal data corruption. Certain hardware vendors promote ECC to support their motherboard services, with HP Advanced ECC [5] , Google ECC [25] , and IBM Chipkill [26] among them. Another bitchecking method for large area failures is ECP [27] , which corrects a failed bit in a memory line by recording the position of the bit in the line and its correct value [28] . Bit-based checking can only deal with limited bit errors rather than massive block failures, however, and more error check bits are required along with increases of native data bits.
Memory-based HA is also considered a part of the entire system's HA. Redundancy has been applied at different levels of granularity, such as the hardware, thread, and instruction levels [29] . SWIFT, a software-only fault-detection technique, duplicates a program's instructions, inserting explicit validation codes to compare the results of original instructions and their corresponding duplicates [30] . CRAFT [31] later improved SWIFT's approach by adding extra hardware structures. In order to direct the level of high reliability, PROFIT [32] adjusts the level of protection and performance at fine granularities based on SWIFT. However, SWIFT incurs unwanted performance overhead as the number of instructions can be easily doubled, mainly due to the full duplication of instructions [29] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an error-injection framework which can provide software-controlled error-injection and data characterization to the hypervisor structure. Basically, we used Syscall ptrace to implement an error injection framework to both static and dynamic data structures. We provided good data characterization in our experiment result. We ranked the most sensitive structures during the running period of the QEMU hypervisor and the benchmark VM. Using Libvirt commands, we implemented a various checkpoint and judge mechanism so that we can determine when we setup and insert a checkpoint and which size should a checkpoint duplicate.
In the future, we will provide more results in terms of both static and dynamic data structures. And we will try to use fork to create the backup process which duplicate the sensitive data from the hypervisor so that we can finally implement the selective checkpointing mechanism. At that time, we will also design the experiment to verify the performance of the selective checkpointing.
